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United Television, Inc. and the other individual defendants (hereinafter 
"KTVX-TV" or "Respondents"), respectful ly submit this br ief in response to 
Appel lant 's, Don Harman (hereinafter "Appel lant " ) , appeal from the July 23, 
1985 decision of the Th i rd Judicial Distr ict Cour t , rendered by the Honorable 
Kenneth R ig t rup , grant ing Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The potentially dispositive issues presented by this appeal may be stated 
as follows: 
1. Are Respondents1 statements capable of two meanings; one of which 
does not impute or infer criminal conduct on the part of Appellant or conduct 
incompatible with the practice of Appellant's profession, and therefore, not 
actionable without the pleading of special damages? 
2. Is the determination of whether a statement is defamation per se a 
question of law for the Court to decide? 
DISPOSITION m. LOWER COURT 
On July 23, 1985, the Th i rd Judicial Distr ict Cour t , the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup pres id ing, granted Respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, holding that Appellant's causes of action did not give rise to a 
cognizable claim for defamation per se or defamation per quod (as plaint i f f 
failed to plead and prove special damages) and, accordingly, dismissed 
Appellant's Complaint. 
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STATEMENT O f FACTS 
1 . The Appellant, Don Harman, is Chief Investigator for the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office and has been employed in that position for 
approximately 15 years. Complaint at 1MT 1 and 2 (hereinafter referred to as 
"Addendum A " ) . 
2. Appellant has alleged that he was defamed by Respondents in a 
news broadcast aired on or about November 8 and 9, 1984. Addendum A at 
n 9 and 12. 
3. Appellant's alleged participation or presence in a Salt Lake County 
Attorney's investigation was the subject of Respondents' broadcast on those 
dates. Addendum A at H 12. 
4. During the subject broadcast, Respondents stated that Appellant 
had participated in a County Constable's sale, while Appellant's office was 
supposedly supervising a corrupt ion probe of the County Constable's off ice. 
The broadcast went on to question whether Appellant, after such 
part ic ipat ion, could continue to objectively conduct such an investigation. 
Addendum A 1F1f 9 and 12. 
5. Respondents' broadcast did not at any time charge Appellant with 
any criminal wrongdoing and, indeed, stated that West Valley City Constable, 
Scott Stowers, was the focus of the investigation. Addendum A 1T1T 9 and 12. 
6. Appellant alleges that Respondents' broadcast injured his 
reputat ion. Addendum A at 1F1F 14 and 16. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Argument One, Respondents will demonstrate that the broadcast in 
question was subject to at least two varied interpretat ions; one of which does 
not impute or infer criminal conduct on the part of the Appellant or conduct 
incompatible with the practice of Appellant's profession. Accordingly, under 
Utah case law. Respondents1 broadcast did not constitute defamation per se 
and is not actionable without the pleading of special damages, which Appellant 
has even failed to allege* 
The Second Argument will set for th the persuasive legal author i ty 
holding that the question of whether a communication is defamation per se is a 
matter of law for the Court to decide. Thus , the t r ia l Court 's Order 
grant ing Respondents summary judgment (hereinafter referred to as 
"Addendum B") was proper and should be sustained. 
ARGUMENT I 
NONE OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT 
GIVE RISE TO A COGNIZABLE CLAIM OF DEFAMATION PER SE 
A. Respondents' Broadcast Did Not Impute Criminal Conduct 
To Appellant 
In Utah, i t is well established that " [ i ] n order to constitute defamation 
per se, the defamatory words must charge criminal conduct, loathsome 
disease, conduct that is incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, 
t rade, profession, or of f ice, or the unchastity of a woman." Baum v . 
Gillman, 667 P.2d 4 1 , 43 (Utah 1983); Al l red v . Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320 
(Utah 1979). Indeed, whether the alleged "defamatory words are actionable 
per se is to be determined from their injurious character ." Baum v Gillman, 
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667 P.2d at 43. "The words must be of such common notoriety that damage 
can be presumed from the words alone." I d . (emphasis added) "Except 
where this presumption exists, special damages to the p la int i f fs reputation 
must be alleged and proved to have been the actual natural result of the 
language used." Nichols v . Daily Reporter C o . , 30 Utah 74, 83 P. 573, 574 
(Utah 1905) (citation omitted) . 
It is obvious that a critical consideration in the application of the 
foregoing legal maxims is that the defendant's precise words be of such 
common notoriety and meaning that material injury may be presumed from the 
use of those words. Allred v . Cook, 590 P.2d at 321 (emphasis added) . 
In the instant case, Appellant contends that Respondents, in their 
broadcast of November 8 and 9, 1984, "charged plaintiff with criminal 
conduct." Appellant's Brief at 4. However, a thorough and thoughtful 
review of Respondents1 alleged defamatory words, the context in which those 
words were spoken and the circumstances surrounding their publication, 
clearly reveal that Respondents1 broadcast in no way charged or imputed 
Appellant with criminal conduct. Indeed, the broadcast expressly stated that 
"Stowers was the focus of the County's Probe," and that " [e ]ven though the 
probe uncovered wrong doing, it fell short of criminal charges." Addendum 
A at fl 12. 
The cynosure of appellant's contention is that Respondents alleged that 
Appellant was involved in a "cover-up" and that the use of that exact term 
imputes criminal conduct to the Appellant. This assertion is based upon 
Appellant's fur ther contention that the word "cover -up ," construed in its 
common and popular sense connotes criminal act iv i ty . While it is t rue that 
words alleged to be defamatory must be construed according to their usual 
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popular and common meaning, Appellant failed to allege the meaning he now 
seeks to assert in his complaint. Western States Tit le Ins. Co. v . Warnock, 
18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 318 (1966). In fact , Respondents1 broadcast 
did not state that Appellant was "involved in a cover-up" as he now 
contends, ra ther , i t was stated that "a recent Salt Lake County Attorney's 
investigation on the same subject may entail a cover -up . " Addendum A at If 
9. 
Moreover, Respondents submit that the term "cover-up" when construed 
in its popular and common sense is not clearly synonymous with criminal 
ac t iv i ty . The word "cover-up" is also commonly understood as an act of 
concealment or fai lure to disclose information, which acts may involve no i l l ic i t 
or illegal ac t iv i ty . 
Inasmuch as the word "cover-up" is readily capable of more than one 
meaning, the facts and determination by the Court in Al l red v . Cook, 590 
P.2d 318 (Utah 1979), become part icular ly relevant and persuasive. Contrary 
to Appellant's representation, the plaint i f f in Al lred alleged that the 
defendants1 statement that "they had twenty-seven charges against him" 
inferred criminal conduct and actions incompatible with his profession, thus 
slander per se. I d . at 321. The Court noted that the term "charges" did 
not necessarily infer criminal conduct, s ta t ing, " [w ]h i le some individuals 
might interpret that statement as criminal in nature, others would not . " j jd . 
The Court went on to f ind that " [s ] ince defendants did not specify the 
substance of the charges, they are capable of two interpretat ions, thus , they 
cannot be recognized as slander per se . " I d . 
As in A l l red , the term "cover-up" is susceptible to at least two 
meanings, one of which does not impute criminal ac t iv i ty . Indeed, the word 
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"charges" is much more commonly used and aligned with criminal acts that the 
word "cover -up . " Thus, under the reasoning and holding of A l l red, the use 
of the term "cover-up" in Respondents1 broadcast is not actionable as 
defamation per se. 
Furthermore, as noted by the Court in Prince v . Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975), whether a certain term is actionable slander "may well 
depend on the circumstances" which include the context in which the word is 
spoken. k L at 1328. Thus , the word "cover-up" can not be segregated and 
construed alone as Appellant has urged. The entire statement must be 
viewed by the Court as a stranger might look at i t . Wainman v . Bowler, 576 
P.2d 268, 270 (Mont. 1978). 
A careful review of Respondents1 entire broadcast as averred in 
Addendum A, without the isolation of certain terms, dispels all doubt that the 
statements contained therein are not actionable. Respondents1 broadcast 
merely reported the possibil i ty of a confl ict of interest on the part of an 
investigatory officer of the County Attorney's off ice. It should be noted that 
Respondents did not allege or assert that Appellant was gui l ty of any criminal 
act. Respondents careful ly stated only the facts obtained from sources 
regarding Appellant's investigation and actions and the term "cover-up" only 
made reference to the possibil ity of the concealment of information in a Salt 
Lake County Attorney fs investigat ion, rather than to an act by Appellant. 
Addendum A at 1F1F 9 and 12. 
Also, throughout Respondents1 s to ry , the facts were cautiously phrased 
in terms of apparency. Courts in other jurisdict ions have identif ied the use 
of such phrases as a factor to be considered when examining allegedly 
defamatory speech. See, Information Control Corp. v Genesis One Computer 
6 
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C o r p . , 611 F.2d 7 8 1 , 784 (9th C i r . 1980); Burns v McGraw-Hill Broadcasting 
Co, Jlnc., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo. 1983). 
Addit ionally, in an attempt to protect the important interests of free 
speech, some courts have taken into account the position of the plaintiff in 
the community when examining the context and circumstances of alleged 
defamatory speech. In Wainman v . Bowler, 576 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1978), a 
police chief brought an action for libel against a local newspaper, alleging 
that the newspaper had published statements that the plaintif f had bullied 
people, concealed or deliberately failed to record certain public records and 
other derelictions of du ty . I d . at 269. The Court in that case, after 
reviewing the alleged defamatory words "bully boy" specifically directed at 
the plaint i f f , examined the context surrounding the publication of the 
statements and stated " [ t ]h is Court notes that 'police officers in this day 
perhaps must be thick-skinned and prepared for abuse.1" kJ. (quoting 
Conchito v City of Tu lsa , 521 P.2d 1384, 1392 (Okla . 1974). Indeed, in Hem 
v . Lacy, 616 P.2d 277 (Kan . 1980), the Kansas Supreme Court observed that 
" [ t ] o preserve our freedoms the expression of individual opinion and criticism 
of public officials must be given broad scope," especially on issues of wide 
public interest , j d . at 286. This Court went on to note that "it is only 
under unusual circumstances that a public official may successfully seek 
redress for injury to his reputat ion." ]<j. This Court has stated " [ t ] h e 
need to provide the media with a margin of error is most clear and compelling 
in cases involving public officials and public f igures ." Seegmiller \/ KSL, 
I n c . , 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981). The plaintiff in this case is a public 
official and Respondents1 broadcast addressed an issue of public concern, 
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i . e . , a Salt Lake County Attorney's Office investigation into corruption in the 
Constable system. 
Thus, the context of the broadcast and the applicable case law mandate 
that the t r ia l court fs decision below, dismissing p la in t i f f s action, be upheld, 
because, while it is possible that some persons hearing Respondents' 
broadcast may have interpreted i t in the way that Appellant asserts, i t is 
equally clear that the broadcast is susceptible to another interpretat ion, 
which does not impute criminal actions to the Appellant and which would 
fur ther the interests of the public and free speech. Accordingly, such words 
cannot be the basis of a cause of action for are defamation per se. 
B. Respondents1 Statements Regarding Appellant Did Not 
Impute Conduct Incompatible With the Exercise of 
Appellant's Business, Trade, Profession or Office 
and Is, Therefore, Not Slanderous Per Se 
As previously indicated, a statement imputing conduct incompatible with 
the exercise of a lawful business, t rade, profession or office is actionable as 
defamation per se, without a showing of special harm. Al lred v . Cook, 590 
P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1979). Appellant, once again, desires to isolate the term 
"cover-up" from the body of the broadcast and argues that the use of that 
term in connection with the Appellant, a police of f icer, necessarily imputes a 
want capacity or fitness for engaging in his profession. This blanket 
assertion, however, suffers from the same deficiencies noted in the preceding 
section. 
Appellant also once again strains to dist inguish the Al lred case from the 
case at bar regarding this part icular category of defamation per se, however, 
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the fallacy of Appellant's reasoning is apparent from a careful review of the 
facts and circumstances in A l l red . Indeed, given the s t r ik ing factual 
similarity of the Al l red case to this case, the rationale and determination in 
Al l red appears to be disposit ive. 
In A l l red , schoolboard members and a private citizen sought to have the 
plaint i f f removed from his office as school superintendent. Id . at 320. In 
connection with these e f fo r ts , the defendants threatened to br ing an action 
against the plaint i f f for alleged misconduct, s ta t ing, r r [w]e have 27 charges 
against you . . . . . " kJ. The pla int i f f in that case did not plead special 
damages and asserted that the defendants1 statements were slanderous per se, 
because the statements inferred criminal conduct on the part of the p la int i f f 
and/or acts incompatible with the exercise of the his profession. kJ. at 
320-21. The Cour t , however, noted that the statements, specifically the word 
"charges," could be construed as not in ferr ing criminal charges and could 
imply conduct attr ibutable to the p la in t i f f s personal reputation as well as his 
professional reputat ion. k i . at 321. Accordingly, because the statements 
were capable of two interpretat ions, one of which was not actionable, the 
statements could not be recognized as slander per se. I d . 
Appel lant, in an attempt to dist inguish the Al l red case from the case at 
bar, asserts that in the present case the alleged defamatory words could not 
be construed to apply to the Appellant's personal reputat ion, while the term 
"charges" as used in Al lred could have been applied to both the p la in t i f f s 
personal and professional reputat ion. In support of this conclusion, 
Appellant notes that while Respondents' broadcast made specific mention of 
p la in t i f f s position as a Salt Lake County Invest igator, the alleged defamatory 
statements in Al l red did not contain a specific reference to the p la in t i f f s 
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position as school superintendent. Yet, this observation ignores the 
circumstances and context surrounding the alleged defamatory statement in 
A l l red . As in the instant case, in A l l red , the basis for the cause of action 
arose out of an issue of public concern, i . e . , the administrative conduct of 
the plaint i f f , k l . at 320-21. More specif ically, Alfred's actions as a school 
superintendent. ]c l . The Allred Court , clearly cognizant of the context in 
which the defendants1 statements were made, held that because the statements 
"did not specifically relate to p la in t i f f s profession but were general enough in 
nature to also relate to the p la in t i f f s personal character," those words could 
not constitute slander per se. I d . at 322. 
As in A l l red , the statement that a "Salt Lake County Attorney's 
investigation. . . may entail a cover-up" and the subsequent statements 
regarding Appellant's individual actions at the sale and the fact that "Stowers 
was the focus of the Corruption Probe" are general enough in nature that 
Respondents1 broadcast may be interpreted as implying action attr ibutable to 
Appellant's personal character. Addendum A at 1T1T 9 and 12. Thus, given 
the holding in A l l red , Respondents' broadcast is not actionable as defamation 
per se, because i t is capable of two meanings and must be proved by the aid 
of innuendo. 
Furthermore, as was the case in A l l red , Appellant has made no specific 
allegations as to how he has been harmed in his profession, rather, he alleges 
that Respondents' broadcast has caused him to suffer "a serious blow to his 
credibi l i ty among his colleagues and his abil i ty to function effectively as a 
law-enforcement of f icer . " Appellant's Brief at 10. The Allred Cour t , after 
observing that the plaint i f f had made no specific allegations as to how he had 
been harmed by the defendants' statements, but merely "generalized in 
10 
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futur is t ic terms that . . . he would become Mess ef fect ive, ' " held that such 
an allegation regarding his future employment, without the allegation of actual 
damages, did not give rise to a cause of action under either per se or per 
quod defamation. JcJ. at 322. Accordingly, Appellant has not alleged 
damages suff icient to form the basis of a defamation action. 
Final ly, Appellant posits that had the Appellant been involved in a 
cover -up , he would have been rendered criminally liable under the six Utah 
statutes cited in his br ief . Appellant's Brief at 9. In i t ia l ly , i t must be 
observed that at no time dur ing Respondents1 broadcast was the Appellant 
charged with being involved in a cover-up or part icipat ing in any criminal 
ac t iv i ty . Addendum A at 1f1f 9 and 12. Addi t ional ly, even i f the Respondents 
had stated that Appellant had been involved in a cover-up, i t is highly 
debatable that any of the statutes enumerated in Appellant's br ief would have 
been violated by Appellant's actions. 
C. The Foregoing Demonstrates That Appellant Has Not Alleged Facts 
Which Constitute Defamation Per Se, Therefore, Appellant May Only 
Maintain His Action Under TFe"Theory of Defamation Per Quod 
Which Requires a Pleading and Proving of Special Damages. 
Where a statement is not defamatory on its face and it is necessary to be 
aware of certain facts in order to understand its defamatory implications, the 
statement is defined as defamation per quod. Al l red v . Cook, 590 P.2d 318 
at 332 (Utah 1979); Prince v . Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). In 
Utah, i f the action is not defamation per se, the plaint i f f must plead and 
prove special damages in order to recover. Al lred >/. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 at 
322; Western States Tit le Ins. Co. v . Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 
11 
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317 (1966); Nichols v . Daily Reporter, Co . , 30 Utah 74, 83 P. 573, 574 
(1905). 
The preceding arguments have demonstrated that Appel lants Complaint is 
facially deficient, in that the statements alleged to be defamatory are capable 
of two meanings; one meaning which may be understood to infer criminal 
conduct or conduct incompatible with Appellant's profession, and one meaning 
which could not be construed as defamation per se without the allegation of 
certain extraneous facts. Likewise, Appellant's Complaint is inadequate to 
sustain a claim under defamation per quod, because he has failed to plead 
special damages. Plaintiff has merely alleged that he has sustained damages 
to his reputation and suffered mental anguish. Addendum A at HH 16, 17, 
18, 25 and 26. These claims are inadequate to support an action based on 
defamation per quod. See, Restatement (Second) of To r ts , § 575, comments b 
and c (1977). Indeed, i t is well established that " [ l ]oss of reputation alone 
is not enough to make the defamer liable . . . unless i t is reflected in some 
kind of economic or pecuniary loss." ]cL at comment b. Fur ther , "emotional 
distress caused to the plaint i f f . . . is not special harm," even when "such 
distress results in serious i l lness." ]c l . at comment c. Accordingly, because 
Appellant has failed to adequately allege special damages, he cannot maintain 
a cause of action for defamation per quod and his complaint must be 
dismissed. 
12 
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ARGUMENT II 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A COMMUNICATION IS DEFAMATION PER SE 
IS A QUESTION OF LAW FOR DETERMINATION BY THE COURTS 
ACCORDINGLY, THE T R I A L COURT'S DETERMINATION T H A T 
RESPONDENTS' BROADCAST DID NOT GIVE RISE TO A COGNIZABLE 
CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION PER SE SHOULD BE UPHELD 
Appellant's statement of the legal principles governing the role of the 
Court and the jury in defamation actions is correct insofar as some courts' 
conclusions. However, Appellant overlooks the numerous decisions in other 
jurisdictions, indeed, what appears to be a clear majority of courts, who have 
held that " [ i ] t is a matter of law for the Court to determine if a publication 
is libelous per se, as opposed to a fact determination for the fact f inder as to 
the publication being libelous per quod. Marchiondo \ / . New Mexico State 
Tr ibune C o . , 648 P.2d 321 , 326 ( N . M . C t . App. 1981); Robert K. Bell 
Enterprises v . Tulsa County Fair , 695 P.2d 513, 516 (Okla . 1985); Fernandes 
v . Tenbruggencate, 649 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.1 (Haw. 1982); Loeb v . New Times 
Communications, 497 F .Supp. 85, 90 ( S . D . N . Y . 1980)(app!ying New York 
state law) ; and Gomba v . McLaughlin, 493 P.2d 684, 686 (Colo. Ct . App. 
1971) , rev'd 0£ other grounds, 504 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1973). T h u s , 
Respondents contend that cases cited by the Appellant for the proposition 
tha t , in all but extreme cases the question of whether defamation is actionable 
per se should be submitted to a j u r y , represent a minority view. 
Moreover, those cases do not take into account the important public and 
Constitutional interests presented in defamation cases which other courts have 
recognized. Indeed, a great number of jurisdictions, including the more 
liberal California Supreme Cour t , have determined that because of the 
potentially chilling effect on the First Amendment from protracted litigation 
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and the public interest in resolving defamation cases promptly, summary 
judgment is an appropriate remedy to be employed when a Court must 
determine whether there is a triable issue of fact as to actual malice in a 
defamation case. See, Reader fs Digest Assrn v . Superior Court , 690 P.2d 
610, 613-14 (Cal . 1984); Lane v . Arkansas Valley Publishing C o . , 675 P.2d 
747, 749 (Colo. Ct . App. 1983), cer t , denied, 104 S. Ct . 3534 (1984) ; Hein 
v . Lacy, 616 P.2d 277, 282-83 (Kan. 1980); Adams v . Frontier Broadcasting 
C o . , 555 P. 2d 556, 562 (Wyo. 1976). These courts have reached this 
conclusion, despite the fact that establishing actual malice calls into question 
the state of mind of the defendant and summary disposition is generally not 
favored when the state of mind of the parties is at issue, ^d . Cf , Hutchison 
v . Proxmire, 443 U .S . 111, 120 n.9 (1979) . 
In contrast to the issue of actual malice, whether a communication is , as 
a matter of law, defamatory per se, does not involve an issue as to the state 
of mind of any par ty . T h u s , given the foregoing public interest, summary 
disposition appears to be a particularly appropriate method for determining 
whether Respondents1 broadcast was, per se, defamatory. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly elucidates the role of the 
Court in a defamation action. Section 614 provides f , [ t ]he Court determines 
whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning and 
whether that meaning is defamatory. Restatement (Second) of Tor ts , § 614 
(1977) . The jury on the other hand "determines whether a communication, 
capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient." Jld. 
Comment a of § 614 explains that i f , while reviewing the alleged defamatory 
communication, the Court decides against the plaintiff on either of the 
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preceding questions, there is no fur ther question for the ju ry to determine 
and the case is ended. J^J. at comment a. 
In the instant case, the Court reviewed the Respondents1 broadcast and 
determined that the language used was not capable of bearing the defamatory 
meaning urged by Appellant, expressly holding that as a matter of law the 
contents of the broadcast could not support a cognizable claim for defamation 
per se. See, Order of July 25, 1985. Thus , the t r ia l Court below performed 
its proper function and its decision to dismiss Appellant's action and grant 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment should be aff i rmed. 
That the action of the t r ia l Court below in determining, as a matter of 
law, that the Respondents' broadcast could not be construed as defamation 
per se was a proper exercise of its judicial au thor i ty , appears to be implicit ly 
supported by this Court's affirmance of the t r ia l courts ' decisions in Baum v . 
Gillman, 667 P.2d 41 (Utah 1983); Al lred v . Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979); 
Western States Tit le Ins. Co. v . Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 
(1966). In each of the foregoing cases the t r ia l Cour t , pursuant to a motion 
to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, reviewed the alleged 
defamatory communication and determined tha t , as a matter of law, the 
communication in question did not constitute defamation per se, and, 
subsequently, on appeal each of those decisions were upheld by the Court 
herein. 
Once again the Al lred case is part icular ly analogous and persuasive, 
although the Appellant seeks to dist inguish that case. The interpretation 
given Al l red by the Appellant is inaccurate. In par t icu lar , Appellant's 
representation that the holding and the facts in Al lred may be distinguished 
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from this case because Appellant asserts, the plaint i f f in Al lred did not allege 
that the defendants1 statements imputed criminal conduct. Appellant's Brief 
at 13. It would appear, however, as previously stated that the Al lred Court 
believed that the plaint i f f had alleged that the defendants' statements inferred 
criminal conduct when it stated " [p ] l a in t i f f has alleged that the statement 
made by the defendants . . . inferred criminal conduct on his pa r t . " 590 
P.2d at 321. Indeed, the Court went on to note that n [w ]h i l e some 
individuals might interpret that statement as criminal in nature, others would 
not . " Jki. Thus , it would appear that the distinction urged by Appellant 
lacks meri t , because the Al lred Court determined that the defendants' 
statements were not per se actionable as statements imputing criminal conduct 
or conduct incompatible with the plaint i f f 's profession. Accordingly, the tr ial 
Court below properly performed its role in the instant case by determining 
that the Respondents' broadcast could not be construed as defamation per se. 
CONCLUSION 
A majority of jurisdict ions have held that whether a communication is 
defamation per se is a question of law for determination by the Court. Under 
the rationale set for th in A l l red , alleged defamatory language is not actionable 
per se, i f such language is capable of bearing two meanings; one of which is 
innocent. Al lred v . Cook, 590 P.2d at 321. 
A ^ a r e f u l reading of the text of Respondents' broadcast, without the 
isolation of certain terms from the context of the whole, reveals Appellant was 
not charged with any criminal act or conduct incompatible with the practice of 
Appellant's profession. The term "cover-up" which Appellant contends infers 
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such conduct i s , even in isolation, capable of bearing two meanings; one of 
which does not impute criminal wrong, moral turp i tude or conduct incompatible 
with his profession. When this word is viewed in the context in which it was 
used, i . e . , "a Salt Lake attorney's investigation . . . may entail a 
cover -up , " i t is obvious that even i f the term imputes this conduct, it is not 
clear from the broadcast that Appellant was the perpetrator of the cover-up 
or even that there was, in fact , a cover-up. 
Under the holding in A l l red , such statements are not actionable as 
defamation per se. Instead, Appellant must allege special damages, pecuniary 
and economic in nature in order to recover. Appellant's complaint is devoid 
of such allegations, therefore, the rule of law governing the recovery of 
special damages in defamation actions mandates that this lawsuit be dismissed. 
Accordingly, the Thf rd Judicial Distr ict Court's judgment grant ing 
Respondents1 Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant's Complaint should 
be sustained. 
DATED this \/J* day of November, 1985. S  c
Donald J . purser 
Barbara K. Berret t 
ROE, FOWLER & MOXLEY 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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AFF IDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
Barbara K. Ber re t t , being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of Roe, Fowler S Moxley, attorneys 
for Defendant-Respondents, United Television, Inc. dba K T V X - T V , Phil 
Riesen, and John Harr ington. 
That she mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of Respondents1 Brief 
upon the parties to the within described action addressed to: 
David O. Black 
Biele, Haslam S Hatch 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake C i ty , UT 84101 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Off ice, f irst class, 
postage prepaid, on the l ^ ^day of November, 1985. 
Barbara K. Berret t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 2 t h day of November, 
1985. 
Notary Public, residing at 
S a l t Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
May 1 , 1989 
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' , • ,.,^v, 
DAVID 0. BLACK #0346, of 
8IELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRO JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON HARMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED TELEVISION, INC. 
a Delaware corporation dba 
KTVX TV; PHIL RIESEN, 
individually and as an employee 
of KTVX TV; and JOHN HARRINGTON, 
individually and as an employee 
of KTVX TV; and DOES I through 
X, 
Defendant, 
COMPLAINT 
:n< 
Civil No. ^cJx * *->**<•• 
: 1 ^ 
<0 
\/ 
t^&Wff^ 
The Plaintiff, Don Harman hereby complains of the Defendant and 
for cause of action alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. The Plaintiff is an investigator and employed by the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office and has been for the past 15 years. 
2. The Plaintiff currently holds the position of Chief 
Investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and is a peace 
officer. 
3. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff has had the confidence 
of his employer and was of good reputation in the community and among his 
colleagues and peers in the law enforcement community until publication by 
Defendants of the defamatory remarks set forth below. 
4. Plaintiff's reputation as an honest and outstanding police 
officer-investigator is essential to his ability to perform his employment 
to the standards set by his employment. 
5. The Defendant, Phil Riesen is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah and at all times relevant hereto was employed as a newscaster 
by the Defendant United Television, Inc. 
6. The Defendant, John Harrington is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and at all times relevant and hereto was employed as 
a newscaster by the Defendant, United Television, Inc. 
7. The Defendant, United Television, Inc. owns and operates a 
television broadcasting station having the call letters KTVX. 
8. The Defendant, United Television, Inc. the Delaware 
corporation doing business as KTVX TV (hereinafter referred to as "KTVX") 
broadcasting its programs at approximately 5:30 o'clock and 10:00 p.m. 
weekdays and said programs are viewed and heard by a large audience 
throughout the state of Utah and the intermountain west. 
9. During the Defendant, KTVX's news broadcast on or about 
November 8, 1984, at 10:00 p.m. the Defendant Phil Riesen, an employee of 
KTVX stated "the news comes amid the allegations that a recent Salt Lake 
County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may entail a cover up." 
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10. The Defendant's broadcast was heard throughout Utah and the 
intermountain west by many thousands of viewers. 
11. The Defendants broadcast about the Plaintiff placed Plaintiff 
in a false light and portrayed Plaintiff as being involved in a cover up. 
It attributed dishonest actions to the Plaintiff all of which is defama-
tory and made in wanton and reckless disregard the facts and the Plain-
tiff's reputation in the community. 
12. On Defendant KTVX's news shows on or about November 8, 1984 
at about 10:00 p.m. and or about November 9, 1984 the Defendant, John 
Harrington, an employee of KTVX narrated a television broadcast displaying 
a picture of the Plaintiff stating 
"Don Harman is the chief investigator for the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. As such he 
supervised the corruption probe of the County 
Constable operation. As part of that he 
investigated a car sale that took place at this 
West Valley City car lot. At least one Constable 
called that sale Illegal. Don Harman partici-
pated in the sale, putting him in the position of 
investigating himself. Here is what happened: 
West Valley City Constable, Scott Stowers picked 
up an $8,000 car on a court order. Stowers was 
the focus of the County's Probe. Salt Lake County 
Constable, Lynn Huffman says the sale was kept 
secret so insiders had a chance to get the car 
cheap. Harman bid low. The vehicle ended up 
going for $3,200. This report is the fruit of 
the County Attorney's Constable corruption and 
investigation. Even though the probe uncovered 
wrong doing, it fell short of criminal charges. ^ 
In an interview today, County Attorney Ted Cannon 
said he was personally investigating Harman's 
investigation in the car sale. We asked Cannon 
if Harman's actions may have dampened Harman's 
zeal to pursue the corruption probe further. Said 
Cannon "I can't say that isn't so1'. Now that the 
Attorney's General Office and the Salt Lake City 
Police Department are both investigating the 
corruption of the Constable system, and now that 
the County Attorney's investigation has been 
reopened, Law Enforcement officials are saying 
privately they expect criminal charges to be 
filed and that those charges may even extend 1n 
the State Department of Social Services, 
14. Defendants broadcast was heard throughout Utah and the 
intermountaln West and by many thousands of viewers* 
15. Defendants broadcasts about Plaintiff were false, malicious, 
defamatory and made In reckless disregard the facts. 
16. Defendants broadcast exposed Plaintiff to public hatred, 
contempt ridicule and Injured him 1n his profession and In his community. 
17. Defendants broadcast containing the false libelous and 
defamatory Information complained of herein has caused the Plaintiff to 
suffe^ great mental anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation to which 
Plaintiff Is entitled to recover damages against the Defendant and each of 
them in the sum of $25,000. 
18. Defendants broadcast containing false libelous and defamatory 
information complained of herein, has damaged his reputation in the amount 
of $50,000. 
19. Defendants broadcast was malicious or made in wanton and 
reckless disregard of the facts for which Plaintiff should be awarded 
punitive damages in the sum of $100,000. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
20. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 19 of his first 
cause of action and realleges the same herein. 
21. The context of the broadcast by the Defendants about the 
Plaintiff implied that Plaintiff was, and his acts violated the law. 
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Viewers understood the broadcast to mean that Plaintiff was dishonest and 
was engaged in illegal activities. 
22. On November 9, 1984 at about 4:00 p.m. Plaintiff contacted 
Defendant KTVX by telephone and told the Defendant about the inaccuracy of 
the above referenced broadcast during November 8, 1984 and as a result of 
those conversations, Defendant KTVX again aired the broadcast after 
receiving said information on its newscast on November 9, 1984. 
23. Plaintiff has demanded a retraction and apology pursuant to 
45-2-1.5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) and Defendant has failed to 
comply. 
24. On or about November 20, 1984, the Plaintiff contacted the 
Defendant KTVX and requested that the Defendant produce the video tape of 
the November 9, 1984 5:30 p.m. newscast which the Defendant refused to do 
in violation of Section 45-1-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
25. Defendants broadcast containing the false libelous and 
defamatory information complained of herein has caused the Plaintiff to 
suffer great mental anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation to which 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the Defendant and each of 
them in the sum of $25,000. 
26. Defendants broadcast containing false libelous and defamatory 
information complained of herein has damaged his reputation in the amount 
of $50,000. 
27. Defendants broadcast was malicious or made in wanton and 
reckless disregard of the facts for which Plaintiff.should be awarded 
punitive damages in the sum of $100,000. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant, 
jointly and severely as follows: 
1. $25,000 for mental and physical suffering for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 8, 1984. 
2. $50,000 for damage to his reputation for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 8, 1984* 
3. $100,000 for punitive damages for the Defendants broadcast on 
November 8, 1984. 
4. $25,000 for mental and physical suffering for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 9, 1984. 
5. $50,000 for damaged to his reputation for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 9, 1984. 
6. $100,000 for punitive damages for the Defendants broadcast on 
November 9, 1984. 
7. For such other and further relief as this court deems proper 
in the premises. 
DATED this > ^ day of December, 1984. 
DAVID 0. BLACK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 's Address: 
3836 Rosemary Hunter 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DONALD J. PURSER, #2663 
Attorney for defendants 
520 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephones (801) 531-0441 
^".tD IN CLERK SOFHCE 
Salt lake County ' j.^h 
JUL 2 3 1985 
M. Olyjjn Hjad.'oy. Ooft. 3rrf C.«! Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON HARMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
UNITED TELEVISION, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C84-7528 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
On July 15, 1985, defendants (KTVX-TV) moved this Court for 
an Order granting them Summary Judgment in their favor. 
KTVX-TV was represented by Donald J. Purser, Esq. Plaintiff 
was represented by David Black, Esq. 
The Court having reviewed the Memoranda filed by counsel and 
having heard oral arguments thereon, finds as follows. 
The broadcasts which form the bases for plaintiff's causes 
of action do not give rise to a cognizable claim for defamation 
per se. Plaintiff failed to plead special damages and therefore, 
he cannot even maintain an actioh for defamation per quod* 
Accordingly, the allegations filed by plaintiff against the 
defendants are ORDERED to be DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the 
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merits inasmuch as plaintiff has no cause of action, costs to the 
defendant* 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
z3. itts: BY THJB COttRT: 9** 
JSENtfKTH RIGTRUP [ 
<h^jzZA? P^^tyo/ 
JNM 
Ml I CO I 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
Rw /?Xl / A . .^ 
Deoutv Caflc ^ 
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